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ABSTRACT
Manufacturing plants have a clear life cycle: they are born small, grow substantially as they age,
and eventually die. Economists have long thought that this life cycle is driven by the accumulation
of plant-speciﬁck n o w l e d g e ,h e r ec a l l e dorganization capital. Theory suggests that where plants
are in the life cycle determines the size of the payments, or dividends, plant owners receive from
organization capital. These payments are compensation for the interest cost to plant owners of
waiting for their plants to grow. We build a quantitative growth model of the life cycle of plants
and use it, along with U.S. data, to infer the overall size of these payments. They turn out to
be quite large–more than one-third the size of the payments plant owners receive from physical
capital, net of new investment, and more than 40% of payments from all forms of intangible capital.
∗Atkeson and Kehoe thank the National Science Foundation for research support and Kathy Rolfe for excellent
editorial assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Micro data on U.S. manufacturing plants reveal a clear life cycle: like their biological coun-
terparts, manufacturing plants are born small, grow substantially as they age, and eventually
die. (See, for example, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996.) Economists have long thought
that this life cycle is driven by the accumulation of plant-speciﬁck n o w l e d g e ,w h i c hw ec a l l
organization capital. Theory suggests that where plants are in the life cycle determines the
size of the payments, or dividends, plant owners receive from organization capital. These
payments are compensation for the interest cost to plant owners of waiting for their plants to
grow. Here we build a quantitative growth model of the life cycle of plants and use it, along
with U.S. data, to measure the overall size of these payments. We ﬁnd that the payments
are quite large. In the model, the payments that owners receive from organization capital are
more than one-third the size of the payments they receive from physical capital, net of new
investment.
To give these numbers some additional context, we use McGrattan and Prescott’s
(forthcoming) procedure to infer the total payments owners of manufacturing ﬁrms receive
from all intangible capital in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). This
procedure implies that such payments to intangible capital are about 8% of U.S. manufac-
turing output. In our model, the payments to organization capital alone are about 40% of
those payments.
Our model of organization capital builds on the industry evolution models of Jovanovic
(1982), Nelson and Winter (1982), and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). We model the
accumulation of organization capital at the plant level. Each plant is distinguished by its
speciﬁc productivity and its age, and this pair of distinguishing features is what we consider
the plant’s organization capital. The speciﬁc productivity of a plant depends on the vintage
of the plant’s technology and its built-up stock of knowledge on how to use that technology.
When new plants are built, their blueprints embody the best available, or frontier, technology,
but they have little built-up knowledge. As a plant operates over time, its speciﬁc productivity
grows stochastically at a rate that depends on the plant’s age. We interpret this growth of a
plant’s speciﬁc productivity as arising from a stochastic learning process.
The basic mechanics of payments in our model is as follows. In the model, the owners
of a plant pay ﬁxed costs to start and operate the plant. In return, the owners collect variableproﬁts less the ﬁxed costs of operation as dividends over and above the rental payments for
physical capital and labor. As the plant grows, so do these dividends; hence, the life cycle
of plants corresponds to a life cycle of dividends: young plants tend to have low dividends;
older plants, higher ones. In the model, an owner of an older plant has built up a type of
intangible capital–organization capital–that entitles the owner to high dividends.
In the aggregate, what payments to organization capital should we expect to see in
a steady state equilibrium? With free entry into the activity of starting plants, the present
value of the stream of dividends to the owners of new plants is, of course, zero. At any
particular time, however, the total payments owners receive from organization capital are
the sum of the dividend payments to owners of plants of all ages in the cross section. If
interest rates are positive and plants have the typical backloaded pattern of dividends over
the life cycle, then we expect the dividends in the aggregate to be positive. These payments
to owners compensate them for the interest cost of waiting for the plants to grow.
Our strategy for measuring the payments from organization capital is dictated by
the mechanics of payments in the model. We build a quantitative model of the learning
process that drives the life cycle of plants. The model then implies a corresponding life
cycle of dividends. We infer the payments to organization capital by summing these implied
dividends.
To quantify the learning process of plants in our model, we rely on the simple obser-
vation that the relative size of plants in the model is determined by their relative speciﬁc
productivities. We calibrate the stochastic process by which plant productivity grows so that
the model can reproduce panel data on employment, job creation, and job destruction in
manufacturing plants of diﬀerent ages in the U.S. economy.
When interpreted in the context of our model, these data on industry evolution indicate
that learning is both prolonged and substantial. In the data, as a cohort of plants ages from
newborn to 20 years old, for example, its share of the labor force grows by a factor of about
seven. In our model, these data imply that the aggregate of speciﬁc productivities across a
cohort of plants grows substantially for 20 years. More generally, our model replicates the
patterns of plant birth, growth, and death in the U.S. economy and, hence, quantiﬁes the
accumulation of organization capital in this economy. With this quantitative model, we infer
2the payments to plant owners for organization capital directly rather than as a residual.
We model speciﬁc productivity as an exogenous stochastic process in a way similar
to Hopenhayn and Rogerson’s (1993). Our approach diﬀers from that of a large literature
which models speciﬁc productivity as endogenous. The main advantage of our approach is
that it allows us to match the process for speciﬁc productivity directly to data on the growth
process of plants. Moreover, we need not take a stand on whether this productivity is derived
from active or passive learning, matching, or ongoing adoption of new technologies in existing
plants.
The type of capital that we attempt to measure is one which has long been considered
signiﬁcant. At least as far back as Marshall (1930, Book iv, Chap. 13.I), economists have
argued that organizations store and accumulate knowledge that aﬀects their technology of
production. This accumulated knowledge is a type of unmeasured capital distinct from the
concepts of physical or human capital in the standard growth model. We think of this type
of knowledge as driving the life cycle of plants and, hence, being the source of organization
capital.
In terms of the literature, two broad themes have emerged since Marshall’s (1930) work.
One of those themes is that organization capital is a ﬁrm-speciﬁco rp l a n t - s p e c i ﬁc capital good
jointly produced with output and embodied in the organization itself. Rosen (1972), Ericson
and Pakes (1995), and many others have developed models in which organization capital is
acquired by endogenous learning-by-doing. We follow this theme and regard organization
capital as embodied in the plant and as being jointly produced with measured output. In
our model, this asset is transferable by selling the plant and payments to organization capital
ﬂow to owners of the plant.
A second broad theme in the literature is that organization capital is embodied in the
ﬁrm’s workers or in their matches to tasks within the ﬁrm. Jovanovic (1979), Prescott and
Visscher (1980), Becker (1993), and others have developed explicit microeconomic models of
this idea. Jovanovic and Moﬃt (1990), Topel (1991), and others have measured diﬀerent
aspects of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. Models that follow this theme have at least some of
the payments to organization capital ﬂow to workers, depending on how owners and workers
divide the match-speciﬁc quasi-rents. (See Rosen 1972 for a useful discussion of how diﬀerent
3types of organization capital lead to diﬀe r e n tp a t t e r n so fp a y m e n t st oo w n e r sa n dw o r k e r s . )
In our model, all payments to organization capital ﬂow to owners of plants, and our
empirical strategy is designed to measure these payments. Developing a model that builds on
the second theme, in which some of the payments to organization capital ﬂow to workers, and
using that model to measure such payments in the data is an interesting–and separate–
exercise.
I. The Life Cycle of Plants and Organization Capital:
An Illustration
Here we illustrate the connection between the life cycle of plants and the measurement of
payments to organization capital in a steady state in a simpliﬁe dv e r s i o no fo u rm o d e l .W e
then discuss some extensions.
In the model, time is discrete and is denoted by periods t =0 ,1,2,.... Production is
carried out in plants. In any period, a plant is characterized by its age s, which determines
its production function fs. Each plant lives from age s =0through age s = N. The economy
is in a steady state with overlapping generations of plants arranged into N +1cohorts, all of
size 1.
To operate, a plant pays a ﬁxed cost wm to use one unit of a ﬁx e df a c t o ro fp r o d u c t i o n
and hires labor l at wage w as a variable input. Output in a plant of age s which hires ls
units of labor is ys = fs(ls). The decision of how much labor to hire in a plant of age s is
static and given by
ds =m a x
l
fs(l) − wl,
where ds is the variable proﬁts of the plant. Employment in plants of cohort s is denoted by
ls,w h i c hs o l v e sf0
s(ls)=w.
The dividends (or proﬁts) to the owner of the plant are the variable proﬁts minus the
ﬁxed cost. The economy has free entry in starting new plants. This free entry implies that






(ds − wm)=0 , (1)
where 1+i is the real interest rate.
4Here consumers and the deﬁnition of equilibrium are standard. In a steady state, the
(gross) real interest rate 1+i is equal to 1/β,w h e r eβ is the consumer discount factor. The
wage is such that the labor market-clearing condition
PN
s=0 ls =1holds, and the free entry
condition (1) determines the price wm of the ﬁxed factor.
The characteristics of a plant’s life cycle are determined by the dependence of the
plant’s production function on its age. For example, if the marginal product of labor increases
with age, then older plants will be larger, in that they hire more labor than younger plants.
This plant life cycle gives rise to a life cycle of dividends, deﬁned as the time pattern of
dividends ds − wm.
The organization capital of a plant is also indexed by its age s. The basic idea is
that the owners of a plant of age s are entitled to the stream of dividends that remain after
operating costs are paid, {ds+k − wm}
N−s
k=0 . These are, in eﬀect, payments to the owners for
the knowledge built up in the plants over time. Clearly, free entry (1) implies that the value
of the organization capital of a plant of age 0 is zero. But if dividends are backloaded, in the
sense that ds tends to rise with age, then the value of organization capital of plants of age
s>0 is typically positive.
Consider now the income and product accounts of this economy. Aggregate output
is the sum of output across plants
PN
s=0 ys, while aggregate payments to labor and the ﬁxed
factor are also the relevant sum across plants
PN
s=0(wls + wm). Consumers, in their role as








(ds − wm). (2)
Note that π is the cross section aggregate amount of dividends. We interpret π as the
payments to owners of plants as compensation for their organization capital, as measured in
the income and product accounts of this economy.
Comparing (1) and (2) reveals that together the life cycle of dividends and the real
interest rate determine the payments owners receive for organization capital. If either the
real interest rate i is zero or dividends do not vary with age, then these payments π are
5zero. Alternatively, if the real interest rate is positive and dividends are backloaded, in that
dividends ds tend to grow with age, then these payments π are positive. Moreover, the more
backloaded the dividends, the larger are the payments π.
A simple example illustrates the relationship between the backloading of dividends
and the payments to organization capital. Let variable proﬁts grow with plant age at rate
γ>1,s ot h a tds = γsd0. Then the free entry condition (1) implies that the payments to the




s=0[1/(1+i)]s and the payments to organization
capital are π = d0(N +1 )
PN








These weights sum to zero and are monotonically increasing. Hence, payments to organization
capital are increasing in the extent of backloading as indexed by γ.
Theoretically, at least, a perverse case may exist in which the dividends could be so
frontloaded that payments to organization capital would actually be negative. If, however,
we add to the model the possibility of free exit, so that plants can exit at no cost, then






(ds − wm) ≥ 0 (3)
It is easy to show that under (3), the payments to organization capital (2) are always nonneg-
ative, and as long as interest rates are positive, these payments are strictly positive whenever
the dividend stream is not completely ﬂat.1
Now we brieﬂy describe several extensions of this simpliﬁed model.
First, in the simpliﬁed model we assumed that a ﬁxed factor results in a ﬁxed operating
cost wm. Adding an initial entry cost that simply gets subtracted from (1) and (2) is trivial.
Doing so tends to increase the measured payments to organization capital in the cross section
because it tends to increase the backloading of dividends.
Second, we have assumed perfect competition and that variable proﬁts arise because
the variable factors have diminishing returns. Alternatively, variable proﬁts may arise be-
6cause of imperfect competition. Below we show that a model with free entry and imperfect
competition is isomorphic to what we have here.
Third, in our model, all payments to organization capital are payments to the owners of
plants, while workers are simply paid their static marginal product. If we introduce dynamic
employment features that break the relationship between current wages and current marginal
product, then some of the payments to labor will also be payments to a diﬀerent form of or-
ganization capital. Several researchers, including Jovanovic (1979) and Prescott and Visscher
(1980), build models with these features. Quantifying the ﬂow of payments to organization
capital that are received by workers is an interesting and important exercise–but not one we
are attempting.
Finally, in the next section, we extend the simple model to incorporate physical capital
and uncertainty. We add these features so that we can compare the predictions of the model
to the U.S. NIPA when we choose the model’s parameters to reproduce U.S. data on the life
cycle of plants.
II. A Model of Organization Capital
Now we set up our model of organization capital. We then show how to use data on the size
of plants over the life cycle to infer the corresponding life cycle of plant dividends. Finally,
we show how to extend the model to allow for imperfect competition.
A. The Setup
In our model, time is still discrete and denoted by periods t =0 ,1,2,....The economy has




t log(ct),w h e r eβ is the discount factor. Each household consists of a worker and a
manager, each of whom supplies one unit of labor inelastically. Households are also endowed
with the initial stock of physical capital and ownership of the plants that exist in period
0. Households face sequences of wages for workers, wages for managers, and intertemporal
prices {wt,w mt,p t}
∞
t=0; have initial capital holdings k0; and own an initial asset value a0 of
the plants that exist in period 0. Given all that, households choose sequences of consumption
{ct}
∞






pt(wt + wmt)+k0 + a0. (4)
Production in this economy is carried out in plants. In any period, a plant is charac-
terized by its speciﬁcp r o d u c t i v i t yA and its age s. To operate, a plant uses physical capital
and (workers’) labor as variable inputs and one unit of a manager’s time as a ﬁxed factor. If





where the function F is linearly homogeneous of degree 1 and the parameter ν ∈ (0,1). The
technology parameter z is common to all plants and grows at an exogenous rate. We call
z economy-wide productivity. Following Lucas (1978, p. 511), we call ν the span of control
parameter of a plant’s manager. Here the parameter ν may be interpreted as determining
the degree of diminishing returns at the plant level.
We refer to the pair (A,s) as a plant’s organization-speciﬁc capital, or simply its
organization capital. This pair summarizes the built-up expertise that distinguishes one plant
from another.
The timing of events in period t is as follows. The decision whether to operate or not is
made at the beginning of the period. Plants that do not operate produce nothing; the organi-
zation capital in these plants is lost permanently. Plants with organization capital (A,s) that
do operate, in contrast, hire a manager, capital kt, and labor lt and produce output according
to (5). At the end of the period, operating plants draw independent innovations   to their
speciﬁc productivity, with probabilities given by age-dependent distributions {πs}.T h u s ,a
plant with organization capital (A,s) that operates in period t has stochastic organization
capital (A ,s +1 )at the beginning of period t +1 .
Consider the process by which a new plant enters the economy. Before a new plant can
enter in period t, a manager must spend period t− 1 preparing and adopting a blueprint for
constructing the plant that determines the plant’s initial speciﬁc productivity τt.B l u e p r i n t s
adopted in period t − 1 embody the frontier of knowledge regarding the design of plants at
8that point in time. These blueprints evolve exogenously, according to the sequence {τt}
∞
t=0.
Thus, a plant built in t−1 starts period t with initial speciﬁc productivity τt and organization
capital (A,s)=( τt,0). We refer to growth in τt as embodied technical change.
We assume that capital and labor are freely mobile across plants in each period. Thus,
for any plant that operates in period t, the decision of how much capital and labor to hire
is static. Given a rental rate for capital rt, a wage rate for labor wt, and a managerial wage









ν − rtkt(A) − wtlt(A), (7)
where kt(A) and lt(A) are the solutions to this problem. Then the dividend earned by the
owner of a plant with organization capital (A,s) in t is given by dt(A) minus the ﬁxed cost
of hiring the manager wmt.W er e f e rt odt(A) as variable proﬁts.
The decision whether or not to operate a plant is dynamic. This decision problem is
described by the Bellman equation
Vt(A,s)=m a x
"





Vt+1(A ,s +1 ) πs+1(d )
#
, (8)
where the sequences {τt,w t,r t,w mt,p t}
∞
t=0 are given. The value Vt(A,s) is the expected
discounted stream of returns to the owner of a plant with organization capital (A,s).T h i s
value is the maximum of the returns from closing the plant and those from operating it. The
second term on the right side of (8) is the expected discounted value of operating a plant of
type (A,s). It consists of current returns dt(A) − wmt and the discounted value of expected
future returns Vt+1(A,s). The plant operates only if the expected returns from operating it
are nonnegative. We let the plant operating decision xt(A,s) equal one if the plant operates
at t and zero otherwise.
The decision whether or not to hire a manager to prepare a blueprint for a new plant
is also dynamic. In period t, this decision is determined by the equation
9V
0




The value V 0
t is the expected stream of returns to the owner of a new plant, net of the initial
ﬁxed cost wmt of paying a manager to prepare the blueprint for the plant.
Let µt denote the distribution in period t of organization capital across plants that
might operate in that period, where µt(A,s) is the measure of plants of age s with productivity
less than or equal to A.L e tφt ≥ 0 denote the measure of managers preparing blueprints for
new plants in t. Denote the measure of plants that operate in t by λt(A,s).T h i sm e a s u r ei s





For each plant that operates, an innovation to its speciﬁc productivity is drawn, and the







for s ≥ 0 and µt+1(τt+1,0) = φt.
Let kt denote the aggregate physical capital stock. Then the resource constraints for








A lt(A)λt(dA,s)=1 . The
resource constraint for aggregate output is ct + kt+1 = yt +( 1− δ)kt, where yt is deﬁned




A A1−νF(kt(A),l t(A))νλt(dA,s) and δ is the depreciation rate. The resource





Managers are hired to prepare blueprints for new plants only if V 0
t ≥ 0. Since there is
free entry into the activity of starting new plants, in equilibrium we require that V 0
t φt =0 .




A V0(A,s)µ0(dA,s) is the value of the workers’ initial assets.
Given a sequence of blueprints and economy-wide productivities {τt,z t}, initial en-
dowments k0 and a0, and an initial measure µ0,a nequilibrium in this economy is a collection
of sequences of consumption and aggregate capital {ct,k t}; allocations of capital and labor
across plants {kt(A),l t(A)}; measures of operating plants, potentially operating plants, and




; value functions and operating decisions
{Vt,V0
t ,x t}; and prices {wt,r t,w mt,p t}, all of which satisfy the above conditions.
B. Linking Plant Size and Plant Dividends
Now we link the variable proﬁts dt(A) of a plant to the size of that plant as measured by its
employment. We need this link because we calibrate the model to match U.S. data on the
pattern of plant employment growth with age. We use this link as well to argue that our model
w i l la l s om a t c ht h ee v o l u t i o no fv a r i a b l ep r o ﬁts of plants as they age. The corresponding life
cycle of dividends is given by dt(A) − wm,w h e r et h eﬁxed cost wm is determined by the free
entry condition.
Consider the allocation of capital and labor across plants at any point in time. Since
capital and labor are freely mobile across plants, this allocation problem is static. For con-










AAλt(dA,s) is the aggregate
of the speciﬁc productivities. The variable nt(A) measures the size of a plant in terms of its
capital or labor or output, in that the equilibrium allocations are
kt(A)=nt(A)kt,l t(A)=nt(A)lt, and yt(A)=nt(A)yt, (12)
where yt = zt ¯ A
1−ν
t F(kt,l t)ν is aggregate output. To see this, note that since the production
function F is linear-homogeneous of degree 1 and there is only one ﬁxed factor, all oper-
ating plants in this economy use physical capital and labor in the same proportions. The
proportions are those that satisfy the resource constraints for capital and labor.
T h ev a r i a b l ep r o ﬁts for a plant with organization capital (A,s) are
dt(A)=( 1− ν)yt(A)=( 1− ν)nt(A)yt. (13)
Variable proﬁts dt(A) minus managerial wages wmt are the dividends earned on organization
capital. Hence, (13) links the size of plants nt(A) with their dividends dt(A) − wm.
11We deﬁne a steady-state growth path in this economy as an equilibrium in which the
quality of the best available blueprint τt and aggregate plant productivity ¯ At grow at a
constant rate 1+gτ; the economy-wide level of productivity zt grows at a constant rate
1+gz; aggregate variables yt,c t,k t,w t,a n dwmt grow at a rate 1+g,w h e r e1+g =[ ( 1+
gz)(1+gτ)1−ν]1/(1−να);v a r i a b l e sφt,V0
t ,a n drt are constant; the productivity-age distributions
of plants satisfy µt+1(A,s)=µt(A/(1+gτ),s) and λt+1(A,s)=λt(A/(1+gτ),s) for all t,A,s;
and Vt+1(A,s)=( 1+g)Vt((A/(1+gτ),s),d t+1(A,s)=( 1+g)dt(A/(1+gτ),s) for all t,A,s.
It is worth pointing out two features of the steady state of our economy. First, in this
steady state, data on the size-age distribution of plants do not pin down the span of control
parameter ν. Second, these data also do not pin down the extent to which technical change
is embodied in blueprints or is economy-wide. (For details, see Atkeson and Kehoe 2003.)
C. Adding Imperfect Competition
So far we have assumed that the owners of plants earn variable proﬁts because production at
the plant level has diminishing returns, as indexed by ν. Here we add imperfect competition
and show that these variable proﬁts arise as well when plants face downward-sloping demand.
The main eﬀect of adding imperfect competition to the model is that it scales up the amount
of variable proﬁts in the economy; hence, it scales up the size of the payments owners receive
from organization capital.
Here each plant produces a diﬀerentiated product which a competitive ﬁrm aggregates
to produce a homogeneous ﬁnal good. Each plant chooses its price and inputs to maximize
proﬁts given the downward-sloping demand from the ﬁrm that produces ﬁnal goods.










and has a static demand function yt(A)=pt(A)−1/(1−θ)yt. Note that we have imposed sym-
metry, in that all operating plants with the same A choose the same output and set the same
price. We have also normalized the price of the ﬁnal good to be 1.
We adjust the notation of a plant’s production function so that, in equilibrium, its








It is easy to show that the static maximization problem of a plant is given by (6) and (7) with
ν = γθ. Note that ν is the product of the diminishing returns parameter γ from production
and the parameter θ which governs the slope of the demand function. (Speciﬁcally, θ is the
inverse of the equilibrium markup of price over marginal cost.) With this modiﬁcation, the
rest of the analysis is identical.
III. Calibration and Measurement
Now we bring the appropriate U.S. data into the model so as to infer the size of the payments
to organization capital in the U.S. economy.
The model’s macro parameters are taken either directly from McGrattan and Prescott
(forthcoming) or from our application of their method to the manufacturing sector as de-
s c r i b e di no u rA p p e n d i xA .
To match the model to observations, we follow McGrattan and Prescott (forthcoming)
and introduce a corporate proﬁts tax τc. We assume that this tax is levied on corporate proﬁts
measured as sales less compensation of employees and the depreciation of physical capital (yt−
wtlt − wmt − δkt). We assume that these corporate tax revenues are rebated as a lump-sum







=1+i =( 1− τc)(να
yt+1
kt+1
− δ)+1 . (14)
We use the values of β = .98, g =2 .02%,a n di =4 .1% from McGrattan and Prescott
(forthcoming). Using the method we describe in Appendix A, we ﬁnd that the depreciation
rate δ =5 .5%; the capital share k/y =1 .46; the corporate tax rate τc =4 8 .1%; and,
hence, να =1 9 .9%.N o t e t h a t τc is computed by applying Poterba’s (1998) method to
manufacturing. As Poterba ﬁnds, the τc we measure is higher than the statutory corporate
tax rate because τc includes the sum of the corporate proﬁt and property tax burdens.
Now consider the parameter ν = γθ. Based on the work of Basu and Fernald (1995),
Basu (1996), and Basu and Kimball (1997), we choose θ = .9, which implies a markup of
11 percent and an elasticity of demand of 10. The parameter γ measures the degree of
13diminishing returns in variable factors at the plant level. Hundreds of studies have used
micro data to estimate production functions. These analyses incorporate a wide variety of
assumptions about the form of the production technology and draw on cross-sectional, panel,
and time series data from virtually every industry and developed country. Douglas (1948)
and Walters (1963) survey many studies. More recent work along these lines has also been
done by Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992); Bahk and Gort (1993); Olley and Pakes (1996);
and Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998). From a survey of this work, we argue that in the
context of a model like ours, γ = .95 is a reasonable value for this parameter. Using that
value gives ν = .85, which is consistent with the discussion of Atkeson, Khan, and Ohanian
(1996).
In parameterizing the distributions of shocks to speciﬁc productivity, we assume that
these shocks to size have a lognormal distribution, so that log s ∼ N(ms,σ 2
s).W e c h o o s e
the means ms and standard deviations σs of these distributions to be smoothly declining
functions of s.I n p a r t i c u l a r ,w e s e t ms = κ1 + κ2(S−s
S )2 for s ≤ S and ms = κ1 otherwise
and σs = κ3 + κ4(S−s
S )2 for s ≤ S and σs = κ3 otherwise. With this parameterization, the
shocks for plants of age S or older are drawn from a single distribution. Thus, shocks to
plant-speciﬁc productivity are parameterized by {κi}4
i=1 and age S.
We choose the parameters governing these shocks so that the model matches data on
the fraction of the labor force employed in plants of diﬀerent age groups, as well as data on
j o bc r e a t i o na n dd e s t r u c t i o ni np l a n t so fd i ﬀerent age groups, from the 1988 panel of the U.S.
Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database (the LRD).2 We choose the data from this
panel because it has the most extensive breakdown of plants by age. We think of choosing
these statistics as analogous to choosing means and variances of shocks to productivity.
More formally, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) deﬁne the following statistics.
Employment in a plant in year t is (lt + lt−1)/2, where lt is the labor force in year t. Job
creation in a plant in year t is lt − lt−1 if lt ≥ lt−1 and zero otherwise. Job destruction in a
plant in year t is lt−1 − lt if lt ≤ lt−1 and zero otherwise. In Figure 1, we report these three
statistics for U.S. manufacturing plants in 1988 for all plants in each age category relative to
the total employment in all plants. This gives us a total of 26 statistics from the data that
w eu s et os u m m a r i z et h el i f ec y c l eo fp l a n t s .
14We set the parameter S = 100 and choose the four parameters {κi}4
i=1 to minimize the
sum of the squared errors between the corresponding 26 statistics computed from the model
and those in the data. The resulting model statistics are also plotted in Figure 1. In Figure
2, we plot the means and standard deviations of shocks to the log of the size of plants, ms
and σs. The parameters that generate these shocks are S = 100,κ 1 = −.1139,κ 2 = .1741,
κ3 = .1945, and κ4 = .0006.
In the top panel of Figure 1, we see that our model matches the U.S. employment
shares fairly well. In the middle and bottom panels, we see that our model implies a bit
more job creation and destruction than are observed in the U.S. data. This is reﬂected in
the implied statistics for the data and the model: the overall job creation and destruction
rates are 8.3% and 8.4% for the data and 10.2% and 10.2% for the model. Note, however,
that in annual data during 1972—93, the standard deviation of the overall job creation and
destruction rates are 2.0 and 2.7. (See Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996.) Hence, our
model’s overall job creation and destruction rates are within one standard deviation of the
observed time series ﬂuctuations in these rates.
IV. Industry Evolution in the Steady State
We have calibrated our model to U.S. data on employment shares and job creation and de-
struction for plants in various age groups. Here we compare the implications of our calibrated
model to other important features of U.S. data on the birth, growth, and death of plants. We
ﬁnd that our model approximately captures most of these features. Hence, we argue that the
model replicates the basic patterns of the accumulation of organization capital in the data.
Speciﬁcally, we compare our model to U.S. data on job destruction in failing plants, the
distribution of employment growth rates by plants, and the distribution of labor and capital
productivity in plants by age. We think of the data on job destruction in failing plants as
measuring the failure rate of plants, in contrast to job destruction, which is the death rate of
jobs. The data on the distribution of plant growth rates are a check on our assumption that
the shocks to size are normally distributed. The data on plant productivity are a check on
our model’s implications that there is no systematic relation between plant age and capital
and labor productivity.
15First consider plant failure rates. In Figure 3, we show the rate of job destruction
in failing plants by age group for the model and the U.S. data. For each age group, job
destruction in failing plants is the ratio of employment in plants that fail in that age group to
total employment. This ratio has the interpretation of a size-weighted failure rate of plants.
Overall, total job destruction in plants that fail is 3.1% in the model and 2.2% in the data.
In this sense, the size-weighted failure rate is higher in the model than in the data. This
result is consistent with our earlier ﬁnding that the overall job destruction rate is higher in
the model than in the data.
Next consider the distribution of plant growth rates. In Figure 4, we show the distri-
bution of plant-level job creation and destruction in the model and the data. In this ﬁgure,
we divide plants into ten groups, based on the plants’ growth rate of employment (measured
here by G =( lt −lt−1)/lt−1), and show the fraction of total job creation (when G is positive)
and the fraction of total job destruction (when G is negative) accounted for by plants in each
group.3 For the data, we again draw on the work of Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996). In
their data, a substantial amount of job creation comes from continuing plants that more than
double in size (15.3%), and a substantial amount of job destruction comes from continuing
plants that more than halve in size (18.4%). In our model with normally distributed shocks
to size, shocks this large are more than three standard deviations from the mean and occur
with extremely low probability. In order to match these extreme observations, we would need
fatter-tailed distributions for the shocks.
Finally, consider the distributions of labor and capital productivity across plants by
size and age. Our model predicts that at each point in time, both of these measures of
productivity are constant across plants. This implication follows immediately from our as-
sumption that the production function is Cobb-Douglas. To see this, note that (12) implies
that yt(A)/lt(A)=yt/lt and yt(A)/kt(A)=yt/kt. For the data, Bartelsman and Dhrymes
(1998) report, for a large sample of U.S. manufacturing plants drawn from the LRD, a geo-










16by age group where the weights α are obtained from a regression of outputs on inputs. In
Figure 5, we report the Bartelsman and Dhrymes values for this measure by age groups.
Although Bartelsman and Dhrymes ﬁnd substantial variations in average productivity across
individual plants in their data, Figure 5 demonstrates that they ﬁnd no systematic relation
between the average productivity of a plant and its age.
Jensen, McGuckin, and Stiroh (2001) ﬁnd similar results in the data. They study
labor productivity measured as value added per hour worked in a more extensive sample of
U.S. manufacturing plants, also drawn from the LRD. They note there is extensive variation
in labor productivity across individual plants in their sample. When productivity is averaged
across plants in a cohort, however, there seems to be no systematic relationship between labor
productivity and age. Indeed, Jensen, McGuckin, and Stiroh report that after about 5—10
years, all cohorts of surviving plants have similar productivity levels.
V. Measurement of Organization Capital
Here we report our model’s measure of the share of output that is paid to owners of organi-
zation capital and the value of that capital relative to the value of physical capital. We also
compare these ﬁndings to corresponding data for the U.S. manufacturing sector.
Recall that in our model, aggregate output is given by




This output is distributed among four factors: physical capital, workers, managers, and
organization capital. The share of output paid to owners of physical capital is να;t ow o r k e r s ,
ν(1−α); and to managers, wm/y; and the rest is paid to owners of organization capital. We
have calibrated the physical capital share in the model to match that in the data, so that
να =1 9 .9%. The share of output paid to labor is the sum of the shares paid to workers
and managers. With a span of control parameter ν = .85, the share paid to workers is
ν(1 − α)=6 5 .1%.
We now use the model to compute the division of the remaining 15% of output into the
share paid to managers and the share paid to owners of organization capital. In the model,
the managerial wage is determined by the condition that there be zero proﬁts to starting new
17plants, namely, that wmt = 1
1+itVt+1(τt+1,0).
In Table 1, we report these shares for the data and the model, with several values
for ν. We start our discussion with ν = .85. With our calibration, 11.7% of output is
paid to managers, so that the share paid to labor is 76.8%, and the share paid to owners of
organization capital is 3.3%. In comparison, the shares in the data are 72.2% for labor and
8.0% for intangible capital. Our model thus accounts for about 41% (3.3/8.0) of the payments
to owners of intangible capital in manufacturing. Since the shares in our model must sum
to 1, the remainder of the payments to owners of intangible capital, 4.7% (8.0 − 3.3), must
show up in another share. Since we calibrate the model to match the physical capital share
of 19.9%, the remainder shows up as payments to managers and is thus added to the labor
share, raising the total labor share in the model above that observed in the data.
The payments to owners of organization capital represent the payments net of the cost
of the owners’ investment in this capital. To put these payments in context, it is useful to
compare them to the net payments that owners of physical capital receive after deducting the
cost of new investment, that is, rk−x. In Table 1, we see that in the model the payments to
owners of organization capital are 37% (3.3/8.9) of the net payments to owners of physical
capital.
Most of the parameters of our model are well-measured. One has greater uncertainty
than the rest, however: the span of control parameter ν. How sensitive are our ﬁndings to
this parameter? Consider raising ν f r o m. 8 5t o. 90 or lowering it to .80 and, in each case,
adjusting α so that the physical capital share να is unchanged at 19.9%. With these changes
in the span of control parameter–the results of which are also shown in Table 1–the share
of output paid to owners of organization capital falls from 3.3% to 2.2% or rises to 4.4%.
Again, because the factor shares sum to 1, the remainder of the unaccounted-for output is
attributed to labor.
More generally, we can show that the payments to owners of organization capital
relative to the sum of the payments to both owners of organization capital and managers is
independent of ν. To see this, note from (8) and (9) that the value functions and managerial
wages are homogeneous of degree 1 in 1 − ν. T h u s ,i fw eh a v et w oe c o n o m i e sw i t ht h es a m e
shocks to plant size, one having span of control parameter ν, managerial wages wmt, and
18value function Vt(A,s) and the other having span of control parameter ˜ ν, managerial wages
˜ wmt, and value functions ˜ Vt(A,s), then
˜ Vt(A,s)




and ˜ wmt/(1− ˜ ν)=wmt/(1−ν). Since 1−ν is the sum of managerial wages and payments to
owners of organization capital, the result follows.
In Table 1, we see that of the 15% share paid to owners of organization capital and
managers together (with ν = .85), organization capital owners get roughly one-quarter of the
share and managers get the rest. Given the above result, this relation holds for all ν. Hence,
for any ν, the organization capital share is roughly (1 − ν)/4, and the managerial share is
roughly 3(1 − ν)/4.
VI. Conclusion
We have proposed a quantitative model of the life cycle of plants and demonstrated how it can
be used to measure the payments to owners of a speciﬁc form of intangible capital directly,
rather than as a residual. The key idea behind our model is that the owners of plants are
making expenditures early in a plant’s life cycle in order to reap dividends in the future. We
think of the activity of starting a new plant as a project of investing in organization capital
that typically yields a backloaded life cycle pattern of dividends. Because these dividends are
backloaded, the aggregate payments to owners of plants for compensation for the investment
in organization capital are positive. These payments correspond to the interest cost to plant
owners of waiting for their plants to grow.
19Notes
1Note that free exit for n = N and n = N − 1 implies that dN − wm ≥ 0 and
dN−1 − wm +(
1
1+i
)(dN − wm) ≥ 0.
Since dN − wm ≥ (dN − wm)/(1 + i) > 0 we have that
dN−1 − wm + dN − wm ≥ 0.
The result then follows by induction.
2Here and throughout, our microeconomic data are taken from the U.S. Census Bu-
reau’s 1988 Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) on U.S. manufacturing plants. These
data are broken down by crude age categories. In Figures 1 and 3, we use data from the
1988 panel of the LRD obtained from the computer disk that accompanies Davis, Halti-
wanger, and Schuh’s (1996) book; these data are also available from Haltiwanger’s Web site:
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/haltiwanger/.
3For each plant, let Git =( lit−lit−1)/lit−1. Then, for example, for the category [0,10%],
the statistic plotted is P
{i|Git∈[0,.1]} lit − lit−1
P
i max{0,l it − lit−1}
.
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23Appendix A
Payments to Owners of Intangible Capital in the U.S. NIPA
1. Method
McGrattan and Prescott (forthcoming) present a method for computing the amount of pay-
ments to owners of intangible capital in the U.S. corporate sector. Here we apply their
method to the U.S. manufacturing sector. We ﬁrst describe a stripped-down version of the
accounting procedure, to give the basic idea, and then we go through the details of the actual
calculation.
In the general procedure, net product for a given sector is given by
Net Product =( r − δ)k + wl + π, (A1)
where (r − δ)k is the rental payments to measured capital net of depreciation, wl is the
compensation of labor, and π is payments to intangible capital. Data on net product NP,
depreciation δk, measured capital k, and compensation of labor wl can be obtained from
the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) produced by the U.S. Department
of Commerce (various dates). The basic idea of the McGrattan and Prescott procedure is
to impute the rental rate r using the equilibrium condition that the return on measured
capital (r−δ) should equal the return i on other investments. Once this return i is speciﬁed,
payments to owners of intangible capital π can be computed from (A1).
When we apply this basic idea to the manufacturing sector and use the NIPA, we must
take into consideration sales taxes and corporate income taxes. First, since the value added
is measured at consumer prices, it exceeds the value added of producers by the amount of
sales taxes. Hence, we rewrite (A1) as
Net Product − Sales Taxes =( r − δ)k + wl + π. (A2)
Next, when corporate income is taxed, the equilibrium condition is that the return on capital
24after corporate taxes (1 − τ)(r − δ) is equal to the return on other investments i,s ot h a t
i =( 1− τ)(r − δ). (A3)
Payments to intangible capital are, thus,
π = Net Product − Sales Taxes −
i
1 − τ
k − wl. (A4)
We measure the variables in (A4) as follows. Net product (NP) is measured as the value
added in manufacturing (VA ) less consumption of ﬁxed capital (CFC), which corresponds
to δk.
The NIPA has no direct data on sales taxes paid in manufacturing. We use the
method of Poterba (1998) to infer these taxes. The NIPA reports the taxes on production
and imports less subsidies, which we denote by IT; it is essentially the sum of sales taxes
(ST) and property taxes (PT). We estimate property taxes and then subtract them from
IT to get our measure of sales taxes. Property taxes are estimated by multiplying the ratio
of tangible assets in manufacturing to that of the economy as a whole by state and local
property tax receipts (SLPTR). Here, as Poterba (1998) argues, property taxes are treated
as part of the value added at producer prices, but sales taxes are not.
We measure wl as the sum of compensation of employees (CE) plus three-quarters of
proprietors income (PI). We include a portion of proprietor’s income in our measure of wl in
order to capture payments to proprietors that are compensation for their labor input rather
than their ownership of the means of production.
The variable k which corresponds to measured capital is constructed as the sum
k = kES + kInv + kLand,
where kES represents ﬁxed capital, the sum of equipment and structures; kInv,t h es t o c ko f
inventories; and kLand, the stock of land.
To compute the tax rate τ, we apply to manufacturing a procedure similar to that of
Poterba (1998) and McGrattan and Prescott (forthcoming). We take the sum of corporate
25proﬁtt a x e s(CT), property taxes (PT), and business current transfers (BT) and divide it by
the sum of net product minus sales taxes (ST) minus wl,s ot h a t
τ =
CT + PT + BT
NP − ST − wl
.
Here we are viewing business transfers as an implicit tax. These transfers consist primarily
of liability payments for personal injury, corporate gifts to nonproﬁt institutions, and taxes
paid by domestic corporations to foreign governments. (See Seskin and Parker 1998.) We
view these transfers as a cost of doing business that owners of plants must pay.
The variable i is the real interest rate, which we take from McGrattan and Prescott
(forthcoming). As McGrattan and Prescott have argued, this rate is the real interest rate
after personal income taxes that a household would receive on an investment. In Appendix B
in Atkeson and Kehoe 2003, we give a rationale for why this is the appropriate rate of return.
2. Results
We report the results of our decomposition in the familiar units of percentages of the value
added, at producer prices (given by the value added at purchaser prices minus sales taxes).
To translate our results into these units, we add depreciation to both sides of (A2) to get
Value Added — Sales Taxes = δk +( r − δ)k + wl + π.
We ﬁnd the following average shares over the period 1950—2001: δk, 8.0%; (r − δ)k, 11.9%;
wl, 72.2%; and π, 8.0%. In addition, the payments net of investment to owners of physical
capital are rk−x,w h e r ex denotes investment. We ﬁnd that rk−x relative to value added is
8.9% over the period 1950—2001. From these results, we ﬁnd that, on average, the payments
to owners of intangible capital, π, are 110% of the payments to owners of physical capital,
net of investment, rk − x.
Notice that the NIPA only measures the total payments to owners of plants for both
physical capital and intangible capital. The McGrattan—Prescott method decomposes these
payments into the payments for physical capital and a residual, the latter of which is the
payments to intangible capital. The decomposition is done by using separate data to set
26the real interest rate i used to compute the payments to physical capital. There is a large
literature, including work by Poterba (1998) and Larkins (2000), which investigates a logically
separate question. That work supposes that there are no payments to intangible capital and
ﬁnds the rate of return on physical capital which would lead the payments to physical capital
to exhaust the total payments to owners of plants for both physical capital and intangible
capital. Hall (2003) performs a related calculation. He assumes that, on average, there are no
payments to intangible capital, and he ﬁnds the rental rate on physical capital which would
l e a dt h ep a y m e n t st op h y s i c a lc a p i t a lt oe x h a u s tt h et o t a lp a y m e n t st oo w n e r so fp l a n t sf o r
both physical capital and intangible capital.
In our calculation of the tax rate τ, we have followed Poterba (1998) in using a measure
of the average tax burden on corporations. Some provisions, such as accelerated depreciation
and the tax deductibility of interest payments, can lead the marginal tax burden to be lower
than the average tax burden. If we redid our calculations with a lower tax rate for τ in (A4),
we would obviously increase the McGrattan—Prescott measure of the payments to owners of
intangible capital. In this sense, the McGrattan—Prescott measure of those payments is a
conservative one.
3. Sources
The following variables come from various issues of the “Gross Domestic Product by Indus-
try Accounts” provided by the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA): value added in manufacturing VA ,taxes on production and imports less subsidies
IT, business current transfer payments BT, and compensation of employees CE.( T h ed a t a
come from two spreadsheets, GDPbyInd_VA_NAICS.xls and GDPbyInd_VA_SIC.xls.)
The following variables come from various issues of the U.S. Commerce Department’s
NIPA: state and local property tax receipts (SLPTR) from Table 3.3, proprietor’s income
(PI) from Table 6.12, and inventories (kInv) from Table 5.7.5. These data are quarterly. We
take the data for the fourth quarter of each year to get the end-of-period stock corresponding
to the end-of-period stocks for equipment and structures. Corporate proﬁtt a x e s( CT) are
measured by taxes on corporate income in Table 6.18.
The following variables come from the BEA’s “Fixed Assets” tables. The variable δk,
27called consumption of ﬁxed capital (CFC), is measured by the series called “current cost
depreciation of private ﬁxed assets” in Table 3.4ES in the September 2002 version of these
tables. Investment in equipment and structures is taken from Table 3.7ES in the same version.
The variable kES, which measures the ﬁxed capital, the sum of equipment and structures,
is taken from the BEA data on ﬁxed assets from Table 3.1ES “Current Cost Net Stock of
Private Fixed Assets by Industry.” These data are end-of-year stocks. We use the number
for year t at the beginning-of-year stock for year t +1 .
The variable kLand, which measures the stock of land, is taken from the U.S. Labor
Department’s Bureau of Labor Statistics Web site, which includes data on its multifactor
productivity program. (We use the zipped ﬁle k2dscdod.txt, which has a table on the stock
of land in manufacturing in 1996 dollars, and the price deﬂator used to convert the stock of
land to current dollars. This ﬁle is found by starting at www.bls.gov/web/prod3.supp.toc.htm
and following the link to “Capital Services by Asset Type for Major Sectors.”) We thank a
referee for pointing us to these data on land.
Appendix B
The Appropriate Measure of the Real Interest Rate i? [Not for Publication]
McGrattan and Prescott (forthcoming) argue that in an economy in which corporate invest-
ments are ﬁnanced out of retained earnings, the appropriate measure of 1+i in (A3) is the
consumer’s marginal rate of substitution, which equals the return that households can obtain
on investments after personal income taxes. We demonstrate this result formally in a simple
economy. In this economy, a representative household faces a constant personal income tax
rate τp that applies equally to interest income, dividends, and capital gains. A representative
ﬁrm faces a constant corporate tax rate τc. To keep the notation simple, we assume that this
ﬁrm is all equity ﬁnanced.






28subject to a sequence of budget constraints
ct + qtst = wtlt +( 1− τp)dtst−1 + qtst−1 − τp(qt − qt−1)st−1, (A5)
where qt is the price of a share of the ﬁrm’s dividends from period t +1onward, and wt is
the real wage. The ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption and shareholdings st are that
β
tUct = λt (A6)
λtqt = λt+1 [(1 − τp)dt+1 + qt+1 − τp(qt+1 − qt)], (A7)
where λt is the multiplier on the budget constraint. We convert the sequence of budget
constraints in (A5) to a period 0 budget constraint by multiplying the constraints in (A5) by






λt [(1 − τp)dts0], (A8)
where s0 =1in equilibrium. Note that the intertemporal price between periods t and t +1







(1 − τp)dt+1 + qt+1 − τp(qt+1 − qt)
qt
(A9)
and, hence, is equal to the rate of return on equity, after personal income taxes.
The representative ﬁrm holds the physical capital stock kt, pays corporate taxes τc,
and pays dividends dt,w h e r e
dt = F(kt,l t) − wtlt − xt − τc [F(kt,l t) − wtlt − δkt]. (A10)
Here F is the production function, xt is investment (which is ﬁnanced out of retained earn-
ings), and δ is the depreciation rate. The capital accumulation law is kt+1 = xt +( 1− δ)kt.
Consider the consumer, acting as owner of the ﬁrm, choosing the objective function
that the ﬁrm should maximize. It is clear from (A8) that the consumer would like the
29representative ﬁrm to maximize the right side of the consumer budget constraint. Hence, the





subject to (A10) and the capital accumulation law. The ﬁrst-order condition for capital kt+1
c a nb ew r i t t e na s
λt
λt+1
=1+( 1− τc)(rt+1 − δ), (A11)







ACCOUNTING FOR OUTPUT IN THE U.S. MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
 
 
   Model 
 
Data  
(on U.S.  
Manufacturing)
a     = .80     = .85     = .90 
Shares of output              
Labor   72.2%      75.7%    76.8%     77.9% 
    Workers     —      60.1      65.1      70.1 
    Managers     —      15.6      11.7      7.8 
            
Physical  capital   19.9     19.9     19.9     19.9 
            
Intangible capital    8.0        —          —        — 
            
Organization capital     —      4.4      3.3      2.2 
            
Other payments            




  7.3     8.9     8.9     8.9 
 
aU.S. manufacturing data are described in Appendix A.  
 
bNet payments to physical capital are measured net of new investment, that is, as rk − x. 
 Fig. 1—Employment statistics by manufacturing plant age  
  in the model and in the 1988 U.S. data 
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Source of data: Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996 
Overall 
Creation Rate: 
 Model  10.2% 




 Model  10.2% 
 Data  8.4 Fig. 2—Mean and standard deviation of shocks to plant size 
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Fig. 3—Job destruction in failing plants by age of plant
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Source of data: Davis, Haltiwanger, and Shuh 1996 Fig. 5—Average productivity of plants by age 





















Source: Bartelsman and Dhrymes 1998 